




Abstract: If, as Richard Wollheim says, the Acquaintance Principle is ‘a
well-entrenched principle in aesthetics,’ it would be surprising if there were not
something true at which those who have asserted it have been aiming. I argue that
the Acquaintance Principle cannot be true on any traditional epistemic interpre-
tation, nor on any usability interpretation of the sortRobert Hopkins has recently
suggested. I then argue for an interpretation of the principle that treats acquain-
tance as the end to which judgments of aesthetic value are the means as opposed
to the other way around.
1. Introduction
InArt and Its Objects, RichardWollheim (1980) refers to ‘a well-entrenched
principle in aesthetics’which he dubs ‘the Acquaintance Principle’ (hereafter
the AP), and which he takes to hold ‘that judgments of aesthetic value …
must be based on first-hand experience of their objects and are not, except
within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another’ (p.
233). Assuming that the AP is well entrenched, as Wollheim says, it would
be surprising if there were not something true at which those who have
asserted it were aiming, even if they have failed to hit the mark.
Not all interpretations of the AP take it to express an imperative,1 but
most do. According to what I will call a Wollheimian interpretation of the
AP, the AP tells you that you must base your judgments of aesthetic value
on first-hand experience or else. Or else what? is the question over which
Wollheimian interpretations divide. Traditionally, Wollheimians have
interpreted the AP as an epistemic principle, according to which you must
base your judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experience or else
forego knowing their truth. Recently, Robert Hopkins (2011) has suggested
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an alternative, non-epistemic Wollheimian interpretation, according to
which you must base your judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experi-
ence or else forego having a legitimate basis on which to believe their truth.
Adapting Hopkins’s terminology, I will refer to the traditional Wollheimian
interpretation as the availability interpretation of the AP (the AAP, for
short), since it holds that first-hand experience alone makes aesthetic knowl-
edge available, where aesthetic knowledge is knowledge that some object
has, or fails to have, aesthetic value. And I will refer to the alternative inter-
pretation suggested by Hopkins as the usability interpretation of the AP (the
UAP, for short), since it holds that first-hand experience alone legitimizes
the use of aesthetic knowledge as a basis on which to form aesthetic belief,
where aesthetic belief is belief that some object has, or fails to have, aesthetic
value.
I will argue that the AP is false on both of these interpretations and that
both therefore fail to capture the truth at which those who have asserted
the AP have been aiming. But I also think that each interpretation fails in-
structively, and I am as eager, in what follows, to take instruction as I am
to refute. I hope, by this paper’s end, to have arrived at a new articulation
that explains why the AP is well entrenched in aesthetics by locating the im-
perative it expresses at the center of aesthetic life. This alternative will differ
from the AAP and the UAP in at least three important respects. One is that
it will treat acquaintance as something that admits of degrees rather than as
something you have either in full or not at all. Two is that it will prescribe
acquaintance merely of things having aesthetic value. Three is that it will
treat acquaintance as the end to which judgments of aesthetic value are the
means and not the other way around. These differences are significant
enough to raise the objection that what I am offering is less an alternative in-
terpretation of the AP than an alternative to the AP. I reply to this objection
in closing.
2. The AAP
Three objections threaten the AAP, each positing a means to aesthetic
knowledge other than first-hand experience. The objection from aesthetic
surrogates holds that we can achieve aesthetic knowledge of things not by
experiencing them first-hand but by experiencing aesthetic surrogates of
them, such as reproductions or photographs in the visual arts, or recordings
in the case of music. The objection from non-aesthetic descriptions holds that
we can achieve aesthetic knowledge of things not by experiencing them
first-hand but by having their non-aesthetic properties described to us. The
objection from aesthetic testimony holds that we can achieve aesthetic knowl-
edge of things not by experiencing them first-hand but by having someone
tell us whether or not they possess aesthetic value.
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I argue that it is clear that the objection from aesthetic surrogates fails,
that it is not clear whether the argument from non-aesthetic descriptions suc-
ceeds or fails, and that it is clear that the argument from aesthetic testimony
succeeds. Given that the argument from aesthetic testimony clearly suc-
ceeds, it may be wondered why I bother with the others. The reason is that
the deficiencies of the others clarify the truth of the AP, which, again, is
my ultimate aim.
2.1. THE OBJECTION FROM AESTHETIC SURROGATES
The objection from aesthetic surrogates seems fatal to the AAP, which
holds:
(AAP)Youmust base your judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experience if they tomake
aesthetic knowledge available to you.
Not only can we have aesthetic knowledge by means of aesthetic surro-
gates, arguably most aesthetic knowledge we have is had by this means. This
fact has led defenders of the AAP, including Alan Tormey (1973, p. 39) and
Mary Mothersill (1961, p. 78), to retreat to a weakened version of the AAP,
one according to which surrogate-mediated aesthetic knowledge is possible
so long as the mediating surrogates are adequate:
(AAP*) You must base your judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experience, or on expe-
rience of an adequate aesthetic surrogate, if they are to make aesthetic knowledge available to
you.
But talk of adequate aesthetic surrogates invites the question when aesthetic
surrogates are adequate, and this is a question, Paisley Livingston has ar-
gued, to which no one has given an adequate answer. Absent an account
of the conditions on which something is an adequate aesthetic surrogate,
Livingston (2003) maintains, introducing an adequate aesthetic surrogacy
clause renders the AAP regrettably vague (pp. 262–264).
But whether introducing the surrogacy clause renders the AAP regrettably
vague depends on whether introducing the surrogacy clause renders the
AAP vaguer than it already was, and this I doubt. Assuming some version
of the AAP to be true, the reason you should not base an aesthetic judgment
of W on an experience of an inadequate aesthetic surrogate of W (however
such inadequacy is spelled out) is that such an experience does not result
in aesthetic knowledge of W. An inadequate aesthetic surrogate of W is in-
adequate, in other words, because it results in an inadequate experience of
W, which is inadequate because it does not result in aesthetic knowledge
of W. But it is not as if every face-to-face, in-the-flesh, or live experience
of W is adequate relative to this standard. Lighting conditions may be
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inadequate; acoustics may be inadequate; performances may be inadequate;
above all you yourself may be inadequate. Indeed, surrogate-mediated expe-
riences are often epistemically superior to their face-to-face counterparts
precisely because you can exert greater control over the conditions under
which you undergo them. But if face-to-face experiences are sometimes inad-
equate relative to the same epistemic standard that surrogate-mediated expe-
riences sometimes are, we need an account of the adequacy of the former no
less than we need an account of the adequacy of the latter.
Hence, the vagueness Livingston takes to be introduced by the aesthetic
surrogacy clause is vagueness that was already there. Moreover, the reason
that vagueness was already there is that vagueness is already present in every
Wollheimian version of the AP. All Wollheimian versions of the AP tell you
that basing your judgments of aesthetic value on your own experience is nec-
essary. No Wollheimian version should tell you that basing your judgments
of aesthetic value on your own experience is sufficient. All versions must
therefore contend and contend equally with the vagueness that Livingston
locates in the adequate surrogacy clause.
I therefore wonder whether Livingston’s objection might itself be objec-
tionable for the very reason that the AAP* is. Suppose we distinguish be-
tween two different ways of thinking about acquaintance. According to
what we may call the binary account of acquaintance, experiences are either
fully or not at all acquainting. According to what wemay call the gradual ac-
count of acquaintance, experiences are more and less acquainting. The mis-
take committed by Tormey and Mothersill in introducing the aesthetic
surrogacy clause, the mistake perpetuated by Livingston in objecting to its
vagueness, is to treat first-hand experience as binary while treating
surrogate-mediated experience as gradual, when both are equally gradual.2
This suggests that the AAP be re-formulated so as to hold:
(AAP**) Youmust base your judgments of aesthetic value on adequate first-hand experience, or
on adequate experience of an aesthetic surrogate, if they are to make aesthetic knowledge avail-
able to you.
Once we recognize, however, that first-hand and surrogate-mediated experi-
ences are both incrementally acquainting and that there is no reason to think
that first-hand experience is, in principle, more acquainting than
surrogate-mediated experience, we should begin to wonder whether there
ever was any reason to separate them at all. As originally formulated, the
AAP holds that you must base a judgment of W’s aesthetic value on first-
hand experience of W or else fail to achieve aesthetic knowledge of W.
The objection from aesthetic surrogates holds this version to be false given
that you can achieve aesthetic knowledge of W based on an experience of
an aesthetic surrogate of W. But the objection assumes that to experience
an aesthetic surrogate ofW is not to experienceW first-hand or for yourself,
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and I see no reason why this assumption should be granted. Suppose you
judge one of the Brahms sextets to be beautiful based on your experience
of a good recording and I judge the same sextet to be beautiful based on your
testimony. Obviously, my judgment is not based onmy own first-hand expe-
rience, but is not yours? After all, it is not as if you are judging on the basis of
the recording’s first-hand experience. You are judging on the basis of your
own first-hand experience, which the recording makes available to you.3 In-
deed, to acknowledge that there are adequate aesthetic surrogates is to ac-
knowledge that there are experiences which are first-hand and your own
but which are not live or face-to-face or in-the-flesh. But I will not insist on
this way of carving things up should anyone object. All sides agree on the es-
sential point, which is that adequate aesthetic surrogates are aesthetically
acquainting in just the way theAPdemands.Wemay of course stipulate that
surrogate-mediated experience not count as first-hand or for oneself, but
even then it would not follow that we must introduce a surrogacy clause.
What would follow is that the experience the AP demands need be neither
first-hand nor for ourselves.
For these reasons, I think that no interpretation of the AP ever need make
mention of aesthetic surrogates. Indeed, I think that no person need ever
have made mention of aesthetic surrogates. Suppose you call a friend on
the phone. The phone is a means by which you talk to your friend, a means
by which your otherwise unavailable friend is made available to you. But
your phone is not a surrogate of your friend. It is not as if, given that you
cannot talk to your friend in person, you just have to settle with talking to
your phone, which just happens to sound a lot like your friend. And so for
reproductions, photographs, and recordings. They make available that
which otherwise is not. But they no more stand in or substitute for that
which they make available than your phone stands in or substitutes for your
friend.4
We arrive therefore at a final formulation of the AAP:
(AAP***) Youmust base your judgments of aesthetic value on adequate first-hand experience if
they are to make aesthetic knowledge available to you.
In one respect the difference between this formulation and the original is
small, consisting only in the addition of the word adequate.
In other respects, the difference is large. The original formulation presup-
poses a binary account of acquaintance; the present presupposes a gradualist
account. The original version awaits the insertion of the aesthetic surrogate
clause; the present has banished it. These two innovations – the gradualist
account of acquaintance and the rejection of any surrogacy clause – will
be preserved in the alternative interpretation of the AP for which I am
arguing.
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2.2. THE OBJECTION FROMNON-AESTHETIC DESCRIPTIONS
The objection from non-aesthetic descriptions holds that we can achieve aes-
thetic knowledge of things not by experiencing them for ourselves butmerely
by having their non-aesthetic properties described to us. Whether this objec-
tion succeeds is thought to turn on the supposedly controversial question
whether there are cases in which we achieve aesthetic knowledge on the basis
of non-aesthetic descriptions. But I am unable to find this question contro-
versial. Aristotle (1984, 1450b, 1453b) suggests one uncontroversial case:
you can know whether a tragic plot is beautiful merely by having the inci-
dents that make it up described to you. Does this show the AAP*** to be
false? Only if a description of the incidents that make up a tragic plot does
not acquaint you aesthetically with that plot, which is exactly what it does.
In some well-known philosophical contexts, acquaintance and description
oppose one another, and this must explain why some have thought that
any aesthetic knowledge you acquire by description cannot also be aesthetic
knowledge you acquire by acquaintance. But the truth is that a good descrip-
tion of a tragic plot is as aesthetically acquainting as a good reproduction of
a painting or a good recording of a musical work. Indeed, I suspect it is be-
cause we take it as analytic that descriptions cannot acquaint that we have
come to think that works of conceptual art are counterexamples not only
to the AP but also to the thesis that works of art are essentially aesthetic.5
Hence, the objection from non-aesthetic descriptions goes through only if
there are cases in which we achieve aesthetic knowledge on the basis of non-
acquainting, non-aesthetic descriptions, such as we would were we to
achieve aesthetic knowledge by inferring something’s beauty on the basis
of a non-aesthetic description of it. But it is hard to say whether there are
cases in which we do this, since any description sufficiently rich to support
an inference to aesthetic knowledge might also be sufficiently rich to provide
a measure of aesthetic acquaintance. I think you cannot read Rilke’s poem
Archaic Torso of Apollo with understanding without gaining some aesthetic
knowledge of the torso described in that poem. Must we say that this is
knowledge gained by inference? Mightn’t it be that Rilke’s poetic gifts are
such as to make the torso available to us an object of acquaintance? Of
course, I am not claiming that reading Rilke’s poem acquaints you with
the torso as an in-the-flesh encounter would. It is clear that an in-the-flesh
encounter can acquaint you with the torso in ways Rilke’s poem cannot,
for all its descriptive power. But it should be equally clear that, unless you
have the kind of critical vision Rilke has, a reading of the poem can acquaint
you with the torso in ways your in-the-flesh encounter will not, for all its per-
ceptual immediacy.
Indeed, once we recognize that the kind of experience the AP prescribes
need not be in-the-flesh, that it can be more and less acquainting, and that
description can make it possible, it becomes difficult to regard aesthetically
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acquainting descriptions as at all exceptional. I am inclined to think it an aim
of much criticism – and here I make no distinction between reviewing and
criticism proper – that it give us a measure of aesthetic acquaintance with
its objects in advance of any in-the-flesh encounter. I therefore suspect that
Arnold Isenberg (1973) overstates when he says that ‘[r]eading criticism, oth-
erwise than in the presence, or with direct recollection, of the objects
discussed, is a blank and senseless employment’ (p. 337.) Anyone who be-
lieves in the power of criticism, as Isenberg does, must regard aesthetic ac-
quaintance as gradual. If an in-the-flesh encounter with The Burial of
Count Orgaz did not bring about less than full acquaintance, reading
Goldscheider could not augment it. But if reading Goldscheider on The
Burial can augment an acquaintance achieved by an in-the-flesh encounter,
I do not see why an in-the-flesh encounter cannot augment an acquaintance
achieved by reading Goldscheider.6
2.3. THE OBJECTION FROM AESTHETIC TESTIMONY
To my mind, the objection from aesthetic testimony is decisive. One formu-
lation of it – supplied by Robert Hopkins (2011) in his ground-breaking pa-
per ‘How to be a pessimist about aesthetic testimony’ – takes as its starting
point ‘the homely thought that we often take the recommendations of others
on aesthetic matters, and that we are right to do so’ (p. 153). Suppose that a
friend of mine recommends a certain film. Under the right circumstances, I
can be acting rationally in going to see that film, as opposed to others Imight
see, based on her recommendation. But I can be acting rationally in acting
on her recommendation only if I have a warranted belief that the film is
worth seeing based on her testimony. Since there is nothing to prevent that
warranted belief from being true, it must be that I can have aesthetic knowl-
edge based on testimony.7
3. The UAP
It is with this version of the objection from aesthetic testimony in mind that
Hopkins introduces the UAP,8 according to which
(UAP) You must base your judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experience if they are to
make aesthetic knowledge usable by you to form aesthetic belief.
At first blush, it may seem that the UAP fairs no better against the objection
from aesthetic testimony than does the AAP.We have just seen that you can
form a true warranted aesthetic belief on the basis of testimony and that you
can rightly rely on that belief in deciding which film to see. How, then, could
the UAP be true?
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Hopkins’s reply is that the UAP is governed by the higher-level norm
ought implies can and so lapses whenever you cannot have first-hand experi-
ence, as you cannot, for example, when a work no longer exists or when too
many works exist for you to experience them all first-hand. As an illustra-
tion, Hopkins has us imagine the following case. Suppose I want to see a
film, there are more films showing than I can possibly experience first-hand,
and I have it on a friend’s good authority that one is particularly worth see-
ing. Since I cannot determine on the basis of my own experience which film
to see, the UAP lapses and I have testimonial license to use my friend’s rec-
ommendation to form a belief. Hopkins stresses, however, that such license
is ‘purely por tempore.’ ‘Once I have seen the film formyself,’Hopkins (2011)
maintains, ‘[my friend’s] view should count nothing in my assessment’ (p.
154).
Though I think there is much to recommend in this way of interpreting the
AP, I begin by registering three reservations. The first reservation is that say-
ing that ‘[o]nce I have seen the film for myself [my friend’s] view should
count nothing in my assessment’ makes too much of the event of my seeing
the film. For one thing, and as already indicated, I see no reason why you
cannot have a measure of aesthetic acquaintance with a film before having
seen it. Aristotle not only suggests that you can become acquainted with a
tragic plot merely by having the incidents that make it up described to
you, he also seems to think that to gain acquaintance with the plot of
Oedipus the King is to gain some acquaintance with Oedipus the King. I do
not see why the same would not hold, say, of Unforgiven or of Fargo. More
importantly, it is unclear to me why we should say that once I have seen the
film for myself, I am thereby aesthetically acquainted with it to the extent
that the AP demands. I grant that when I see a film for myself, I gain aes-
thetic acquaintance with it that otherwise I could not have. But I am confi-
dent that I have managed to see many films without thereby becoming
acquainted with them in any meaningful way. This makes me hesitant to
think there is something special that happens every time I see a film such that
afterward I can no longer give weight to my friend’s assessment, no matter
how thorough her acquaintance and how superficial mine. Of course, if
you hold a binary account of acquaintance, you may think otherwise. If ac-
quaintance is something you have either in full or not all, and if you have it
in full once you have seen a film (whatever ‘seeing a film’ comes to), then it
does seem that once you have seen the film, you no longer need rely on your
friend’s acquaintance. Your acquaintance is as good as hers – as good, in-
deed, as acquaintance gets. But we have already resolved to reject the binary
account and the implausible consequences now before us should only rein-
force that resolve.
A second reservation concerns the difficulty of making sense of the
thought that testimony might make knowledge available to me that I may
not use to form belief. Consider the following altered version of Hopkins’s
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illustration. I have it on my friend’s good authority that the only film show-
ing, a film I can easily see, is worth seeing. Although I judge that my friend’s
testimonymakes available tome knowledge that the film is worth seeing, the
UAP bars me from using that knowledge to form the belief that the film is
worth seeing. But how exactly am I to judge that my friend’s testimony
makes available to me knowledge that the film is worth seeing without al-
ready forming the belief that the film is worth seeing? Surely I cannot judge
that my friend’s testimony makes available to me knowledge that the film is
worth seeing without thereby believing that my friend’s testimony makes
available to me knowledge that the film is worth seeing. And if I believe that
my friend’s testimony makes available to me knowledge that the film is
worth seeing, and I believe that knowledge is factive, then surely I believe
that the film is worth seeing. But then the very belief that the UAP bars
me from forming would seem to be one I already have.9
The third and final reservation concerns negative aesthetic testimony. As-
suming that the UAP is governed by ought implies can, it does not forbid re-
liance on aesthetic testimony when first-hand experience is impossible.What
the UAP does forbid, whether or not it is governed by ought implies can, is
reliance on aesthetic testimony when first-hand experience is possible. If
the UAP forbids anything, it forbids that. So the UAP is in trouble if there
are cases in which we can have first-hand experience but are nevertheless en-
titled to rely on aesthetic testimony to form aesthetic belief. And there are
such cases. Consider yet another altered version of Hopkins’s illustration.
Instead of relying on a friend’s testimony to decide which of several currently
playing films to see, I rely on a friend’s testimony to decide not to see the only
film currently playing. Perhaps I am on a long flight, and though I had been
hoping to see a film, I have a warranted true belief, based on a friend’s tes-
timony, that the only film screening is definitely not worth seeing. It is un-
controversial, I think, that I can be justified in relying on my friend’s
testimony in deciding not to see the film. The defender of the UAP may
therefore want to regard this as yet another case in which the UAP lapses.
But the UAP’s lapsing here obviously cannot be explained by appeal to
ought implies can, since I can see the film. Nothing stops my seeing it except
my decision not to, based on my friend’s testimony. The same holds of any
case in which I have a justified true belief, based on testimony, that an object
has no aesthetic value. I need never experience that object for myself. I can
rely on that belief forever.
How might the defender of the UAP reply? One strategy is to cast about
for some other higher-level norm – some norm other than ought implies
can – to explain why the UAP lapses when judgments of aesthetic value
are not affirmative. But what higher-level norm might do this? It makes
sense to regard ought implies can as a genuinely higher-level because it gov-
erns a multiplicity of lower-level norms. But what higher-level norm – what
norm governing a multiplicity of lower-level norms – explains why the UAP
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lapses only when testimony is negative? The phenomenon to be explained
seems too local to be explained by appeal to any norm that is genuinely
higher level.
It therefore seems a better strategy to recast the UAP such that it refers
only to judgments affirming aesthetic value:
(UAP*) Youmust base your judgments affirming aesthetic value on first-hand experience if they
are to make aesthetic knowledge usable by you to form aesthetic belief.
The problem now, however, is that it is hard to see how a norm of belief for-
mation could exhibit this kind of asymmetry. It is, at the very least, generally
true that whatever can giveme the right to form the belief that not-p can give
me the right to form the belief that p, and vice versa. If seeing that the glass is
not full can give me the right to rely form the belief that it is not full, then
seeing that it is full can give me the right to form the belief that it is full. If
being told that the rose is not red can give me the right to form the belief that
it is not red, then being told that the rose is red can give me the right to form
the belief that it is red. We have established that being told that a movie is
not good can give me the right to form the belief that it is not good. How
then could being told that the movie is good fail to give me the right to form
the belief that it is good?
I am therefore inclined to think that the argument from aesthetic testi-
mony is as fatal to the UAP as it is to the AAP. Whenever aesthetic testi-
mony makes aesthetic knowledge available, it makes aesthetic knowledge
usable too.
4. The VAP
This suggests that if there is an adequate interpretation of the AP, it will ex-
plain both:
(+) why you have reason to experience a work first-hand even when
you have it on good authority that it has aesthetic value, and
() why you have no reason to experience a work first-hand when you
have it on good authority that it lacks aesthetic value.
Advocates of the AAP and UAP fasten exclusively on (+), and this permits
the assumption that precludes their explaining (). That assumption is that
there is somethingwrongwith aesthetic testimony. If you have it on good au-
thority that a work has aesthetic value, yet you still have reason to experi-
ence it for yourself, this, so they argue, must be because aesthetic
testimony fails. It must fail either to transmit knowledge that the work has
aesthetic value or to transmit license to use that knowledge to form aesthetic
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belief. But we have seen that no such failure occurs when you have it on good
authority that a work lacks aesthetic value. Negative aesthetic testimony
transmits knowledge and license. Why should positive aesthetic testimony
be any different?
Suppose that it is no different. How might we then explain (+)? A friend
tells you that a work has aesthetic value. Her testimony makes knowledge
that the work has aesthetic value both available to you and usable by you.
What reason have you to still experience the work for yourself?
I propose that the answer has to do with what you know when you know
that a work has aesthetic value. Recall the case Hopkins describes in which
positive aesthetic testimony makes aesthetic knowledge both available and
usable. This is the case in which the UAP allegedly lapses, the case in which
so many films are screening that you cannot see them all and in which you
have it on good authority that one film is good. What, according to Hop-
kins (2011), do you know when you know that that film is good? You know
that it is worth seeing (p. 154). But if that is so, there is no need to assume
that there is something wrong with aesthetic testimony to explain why you
have reason to see a film when you have it on good authority that it is good.
You have reason to see it because what you have on good authority is that
you have reason to see it.
The point may be generalized. When you know that a work has aesthetic
value, what you know is that it is such as to merit acquaintance. The differ-
ence between positive and negative aesthetic testimony, then, is not that neg-
ative transmits whereas positive does not. The difference is in the content of
what each transmits. When you have it on good authority that a work has
aesthetic value, what you have on good authority is that it is such as to merit
your first-hand experience. That is why you have reason to experience it for
yourself. When you have it on good authority that a work lacks aesthetic
value, what you have on good authority is that it is not such as to merit your
first-hand experience. That is why you have no reason to experience it for
yourself.
We have explained (+) and (). One thing that follows from our explana-
tions is that the AAP and the UAP misunderstand the relation between ac-
quaintance and judgments of aesthetic value. Those interpretations treat
acquaintance as a means to judgments of aesthetic value. According to
them, you must experience works for yourself in order to make a
knowledge-yielding or belief-licensing judgment to the effect that they have
or lack aesthetic value. But surely aesthetic knowledge and licensed aesthetic
belief are not ends in themselves. The meaning of aesthetic life is not the
compilation of aesthetic data. Of course you do need to know which things
have aesthetic value, but this only because you need to knowwhich things to
experience for yourself. Acquaintance with the aesthetically valuable is the
end to which judgments of aesthetic value are the means.
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This may make it seem as if you can arrive at a correct formulation of the
AP simply by reversing the order of explanation:
(JAP) You must make knowledge-yielding judgments of aesthetic value if you are to know
which things you ought adequately to experience first-hand.
I endorse this principle. I just do not recognize it as a formulation of the
AP. The AP does not enjoin making judgments of aesthetic value. It enjoins
acquainting yourself with things having aesthetic value. The AAP and the
AUP appeal to judgments of aesthetic value only for the purpose of
explaining why acquaintance is necessary. Once we have determined that
judgments of aesthetic value fail to explain this, we have determined that
they have no place in the AP, at least not the place we took them to have.
What, then, does the AP state? Perhaps we need say no more than:
(VAP) You ought to experience first-hand the aesthetically valuable as such.
I append the words as such because merely experiencing the aesthetically
valuable is insufficient. Consider the tourist who, having been told that Ver-
meer is a great painter, sets out to have himself photographed next to every
Vermeer in the world. Posing next to every Vermeer presumably requires
having first-hand experience of every Vermeer, but it obviously does not re-
quire experiencing every Vermeer having aesthetic value as having the aes-
thetic value it has, which is what the VAP presumably requires.
These considerations will prompt the objection, however, that the VAP is
overly broad, applying to everything that can be experienced first-hand,
whether or not it possesses aesthetic value. For surely we ought to experience
a crooked smile as having the crookedness it has, a coarse countertop as hav-
ing the coarseness it has, a drop of vinegar as having the acidity it has, and so
on. I grant all this.What I do not grant is that we ought to experience a smile
because it is crooked, a countertop because it is coarse, a drop of vinegar be-
cause it is acidic. Aesthetic value differs from crookedness, coarseness, and
acidity in this regard. If a Vermeer is beautiful, then we ought to experience
it as having the beauty it has if we experience it, but, beyond that,we ought to
experience it. We might express this by saying that the ought in the VAP ap-
plies to you unconditionally, irrespective of your present circumstances.10 If
a Vermeer is beautiful and you are not presently experiencing it as having the
beauty it has, then you ought to alter your circumstances so that you can
take up experiencing it as having that beauty. If a Vermeer is beautiful
and you are currently experiencing it as having the beauty it has, then you
ought to remain in your circumstances so that you can continue experiencing
it as having that beauty.11
Though we have arrived at the VAP by gradually alteringWollheim’s for-
mulation, the difference between it and Wollheim’s is sufficient to raise the
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question whether we can rightly regard it as an interpretation of the AP. For
one thing, Wollheim named the AP, and that the principle he named tells
you that you must base judgments of aesthetic value on first-hand experi-
ence. The AAP and the UAP, whatever their faults, tell you this. The
VAP does not.
Wollheim did of course name the AP. What he did not do is stipulate its
content. Rather, he attempted to articulate the content of a principle that
was, by his own lights, already ‘well-entrenched in aesthetics.’ I see no rea-
son, therefore, to treat Wollheim’s articulation as authoritative. Moreover,
the AP is not true as Wollheim articulates it. You need not base your judg-
ments of aesthetic value on first-hand experience. If there is a true principle
that enjoins first-hand experience, I do not see what prevents our regarding it
as an interpretation of the AP.
Perhaps a stronger challenge to the VAP’s status holds that the AP must
do more than explain (+) and (). It must explain why you are prohibited
from saying that O is beautiful (or otherwise aesthetically good or bad) un-
less you have experienced O for yourself. The AAP, whatever its faults, does
this by appeal to the widely accepted principle that you are prohibited from
asserting what you do not know.
It is unclear to me why an interpretation of the AP must explain why you
are prohibited from saying that O is beautiful unless you have experienced O
for yourself. What is clear is that if the AAP is false, it cannot explain it.
What then does? Here, I can at best gesture at an answer. If the VAP is true,
then when you tell me that O is beautiful, you are telling me, in effect, that I
ought to do something, namely, to experience O as having the beauty it has,
which will often require that I undertake certain actions, develop certain
skills, and even cultivate certain virtues. That means that you are shoulder-
ing a responsibility toward me, one that both gives you reason to make clear
on whose authority you shoulder it and me reason to want this made clear.
There is a difference, after all, between the way you stake yourself when you
vouch personally for O’s beauty and the way you stake yourself when you
merely pass on information that O is beautiful. If you pass on information
that O is beautiful when it is not, you give me reason to question your judg-
ment about whom to trust. But if you assert, on the basis of your own expe-
rience, that O is beautiful when it is not, you give me reason to question
something that goes deeper in you than your capacity to judge whom to
trust: the very traits and capacities that make you the person you are. It
therefore makes sense that we would evolve a conversational norm signaling
when we are speaking on the authority of our own experience and when we
are not.12
Yet another objection to the VAP’s status holds that an interpretation of
the APmust do more than enjoin first-hand experience. It must explain why
first-hand experience is enjoined. The AAP and the UAP, whatever their
faults, undertake to tell you why you ought to have first-hand experience.
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Otherwise, you will not have aesthetic knowledge or licensed aesthetic belief.
The VAP just tells you that you ought to have first-hand experience of the
aesthetically valuable as such. It says nothing about why.
I do not deny that, for everything that has aesthetic value, there is some-
thing that explains why you unconditionally ought to experience it
first-hand as having that value. But why look to a philosophical principle
to tell you what this is? There is something that explains why you should
have adequate first-hand experience of each Brahms sextet, something else
that explains why you should have adequate first-hand experience of The
Burial of Count Orgaz, and something else that explains why you should
have adequate first-hand experience of the archaic torso that transfixed
Rilke. You may discover what those things are by listening to the sextets,
by inspecting The Burial and the torso, and by reading Hanslick,
Goldscheider, and Rilke. You will not discover what they are by reading
Wollheim, Mothersill, Tormey, Livingston, Hopkins, or me. If the VAP re-
frains from arrogating to philosophy what belongs to art criticism, I do not
see why this should disqualify it as an interpretation of the AP.
But others may see things differently. If someone wishes to insist that the
AP has to explain why we must experience aesthetic objects first-hand, or
why judgments of aesthetic value must be based on first-hand experience,
or why aesthetic testimony is weak, or anything else the VAP does not ex-
plain, I have no interest in insisting otherwise. If the VAP is not an interpre-
tation of the AP, that is so much the worse for the AP. Let us be rid of it. We




1 See, for instance, the non-imperative interpretation developed by Dominic McIver
Lopes (2014, pp. 169–176).
2 Elsewhere, however, Mothersill (1986) affirms that first-hand experience is gradual (pp.
331–334).
3 The point does not depend on the example’s being aural. Suppose you judge some Ver-
meer to be beautiful based on your experience of an excellent reproduction and I judge the same
Vermeer to be beautiful based on your testimony. Obviously, my judgment is not based on my
own first-hand experience, but is not yours?After all, it is not as if you are judging on the basis of
the reproduction’s first-hand experience. You are judging on the basis of your own first-hand ex-
perience, which the reproduction makes available to you. I thank Robert Hopkins for pushing
me on this point.
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4 These considerations, if correct, have consequences for Dominic McIver Lopes’s (2014)
non-imperative interpretation of the AP, according to which experiential judgments of aesthetic
value cannot be transmitted from person to person except by aesthetic surrogates (p. 175). I have
been arguing that aesthetic surrogates, so-called, do not stand in for their objects but make those
objects available. But if that is so, one person does not transmit her experiential judgment to an-
other by means of a so-called surrogate. Rather, she makes the object of her experiential judg-
ment available to another by means of a so-called surrogate, such that the other can make her
own experiential judgment of aesthetic value. Hence, Lopes’s interpretation should be truncated
so as to hold simply that experiential judgments of aesthetic value are intransmissible.
5 For more on works of conceptual art as aesthetic objects, see Shelley (2003) and
Costello (2013).
6 I have been indebted, throughout this section, to conversations with Kelly Jolley.
7 C. Thi Nguyen has recently offered a novel argument against the objection from aesthetic
testimony whose subtleties I cannot do justice to here. Much too briefly stated, Nguyen’s (2017)
argument, as I understand it, rests on two observations: first, that while I can act on my friend’s
recommendation to see the film, I cannot claim to know that it is aesthetically good until I have
seen it for myself (pp. 29, 31), and, second, that I can claim to know on the basis of my friend’s
testimony that the film merits being found aesthetically good even if I have not seen it (p. 31).
These observations leadNguyen (2017) to posit two separate properties – the subjective property
of being aesthetically good, knowledge of which does not transfer via testimony, and the objec-
tive property of meriting being found aesthetically good, knowledge of which does transfer via
testimony (pp. 30–32). I agree with both of Nguyen’s observations, but wonder if positing two
separate properties is the best way to account for them. I at least am struggling to see how a film
could merit being found aesthetically good except by being aesthetically good. And this has me
struggling to see how I could know that the film has the former property without also knowing
that it has the latter, even if some conversational norm forbids my saying so. I speculate briefly
on the nature of this conversational norm in the last section of this paper.
8 Although Hopkins introduces and defends the UAP, he stops short of endorsing it.
9 I thank an anonymous editor of this journal for bringing this objection to the UAP tomy
attention.
10 To say that you ought unconditionally to do something in the sense employed here is not to
say that you ought overridingly to do it. If View of Delft is beautiful, you have an unconditional
yet defeasible reason to see it as having the beauty it has. I follow bothKatalinMakkai (2010, p.
405) andRichardMoran (2012, pp. 304–305) in regarding judgments of beauty as unconditional
in this sense.
11 Presumably, this is what Kant (2000) was on to when he remarked that ‘we linger over the
consideration of the beautiful’ (p. 222).
12 The account I am gesturing toward bears some resemblance to the account developed by
Jon Robson (2015). I agree with Robson that the norm that forbids saying ‘O is beautiful’ unless
you have experienced O for yourself is conversational merely. But whereas Robson explains the
evolution of this norm by appeal to the speaker’s desire that others regard her as possessing the
skills and virtues required graspO’s beauty, I explain it by appeal to the speaker’s desire to make
clear to others the kind of responsibility she bears toward them.
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